197
שלש הפרשיות מטות מסעי דברים "תמיד35 חלים בין המצרים כי הוא דבר בעתו"36 (ומבאר כמה פרטים בהשייכות דתוכן שלש פרשיות אלו לימי בין המצרים).
וע"פ הנ"ל יש כאן רמז גלוי לענין בין המצרים בשמה של הפרשה הראשונה (משלש פרשיות אלו) — שע"פ מנהג ישראל (דתורה הוא) נק' "מטות"37 (ע"ד "מקל שקד").
ויש לומר, שתוכן הנ"ל שב"מקל (שקד)" ו"מטה" — הכח והתוקף להפוך מצב בלתי רצוי לטוב — מרומז בפרטי פרשה זו, שיש בה שלשה ענינים: (א) פרשת נדרים, (ב) מלחמת מדין, (ג) סיפור בני גד ובני ראובן.
נדרים: ידוע הביאור38 במאמרי חז"ל בענין הנדרים — שנראים כסותרים זל"ז, שבמקום אחד אמרו39 "נדרים סייג לפרישות", ובירושלמי40 איתא "לא דייך מה שאסרה לך תורה" —
שמדובר בהם בשתי דרגות שונות בעבודת האדם: בתחילת העבודה צ"ל זהירות יתירה שעניני העולם לא יורידו את האדם להיות שקוע בגשמיות וחומריות, ולכן צ"ל הפרישות מעניני העולם, ו"נדרים סייג לפרישות"; אבל לאחרי שהאדם מתעלה בעבודתו, ומאיר בו אור הקדושה עד שביכולתו לברר ולזכך גשמיות העולם ולהעלותה לקדושה, הרי אדרבה, עליו להתעסק בבירור וזיכוך העולם.
ומזה מובן, שפרשת נדרים מכוונת בעיקר לאדם שהוא בתחלת ואמצע עבודתו שלכן זקוק לפרישות מן העולם.
אבל התכלית שבדבר היא — הפרת41 הנדר (ע"י האב והבעל), וכן התרת41 הנדר (ע"י החכם) — שהאב והבעל והחכם בכחם לפעול, שגם אדם כזה, שמצד עצמו, ומצבו — שזקוק הוא לנדרים (להפרישו מעניני העולם), יוכל להעלות את עניני העולם לקדושה (הם מבטלים את הנדר ומהפכים את האיסור להיתר42).
וזוהי השייכות בין פרשת נדרים ל"מטות" — כי תכליתם של נדרים, הפרתם, הוא ע"י נתינת ופעולת התוקף ("מטה") להפוך ב"מהירות" את חושך העולם לאור הקדושה.
מלחמת מדין: עיקר האריכות בפרשתנו אינה ע"ד המלחמה ונצחונם של בנ"י, אלא ע"ד השלל והמלקוח של מדין43, טהרתן והכשרתן של כלי מדין44, וכן חלוקת השלל ותרומת המכס לה' ממנו45.
הערות
- 35. משא"כ פ' פינחס שחלה לפעמים לפני ימי בין המצרים.
- 36. ל' השל"ה שם (שסו, ב).
- 37. ראה לקו"ש שם ע' 382 הערה 34.
- 38. לקו"ת מטות פד, סע"ב ואילך. ובכ"מ. וראה גם לעיל ע' 191 ואילך.
- 39. אבות פ"ג מי"ג.
- 40. נדרים פ"ט ה"א.
- 41. ראה (בהחילוק בין הפרת אב ובעל והתרת חכם) — ספרי (ורש"י) ר"פ מטות (נדרים עז, סע"ב ואילך). כתובות עד, ב. נדרים סח, א וש"נ. וראה בפרטיות אנציקלופדי' תלמודית ערך הפרה (ע' קיג ואילך) וערך התרת נדרים (ע' שלז ואילך) וש"נ.
- 42. ראה לקו"ת שם (פד, ג): והפר את נדרה דהיינו שהוא מהפך חשוכא לנהורא כו'. ע"ש. וראה גם אוה"ת מטות (ע' א'רדע ואילך. שם ע' א'שיט. א'שכוז). ועוד.
- 43. לא, ט ואילך.
- 44. שם, יטכד ובפרש"י.
- 45. שם, כה ואילך.
משנה אבות ג׳:י״ג - הטקסט מספריא
רבי עקיבא אומר שחוק וקלות ראש מרגילין לערוה. מסורת סייג לתורה. מעשרות סייג לעושר. נדרים סייג לפרישות. סייג לחכמה שתיקה.
נדרים ע״ז ב - הטקסט מספריא
בְּקִיטוֹנָא דְבֵי רַב, עוֹמֵד, יְחִידִי, וּבַלַּיְלָה.
אָמַר רַבָּה אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה, נִשְׁאָלִין נְדָרִים עוֹמֵד, יְחִידִי, וּבַלַּיְלָה, וּבַשַּׁבָּת, וּבִקְרוֹבִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָיָה לָהֶן פְּנַאי מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם.
עוֹמֵד? וְהָתַנְיָא: יָרַד רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִן הַחֲמוֹר וְנִתְעַטֵּף וְיָשַׁב וְהִתִּיר לוֹ נִדְרוֹ. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: פּוֹתְחִין בַּחֲרָטָה. מִיעְקַר נִדְרָא בָּעִינַן, וּבָעֵי עַיּוֹנֵי, אַהָכִי יָשַׁב. וְרַב נַחְמָן סָבַר: אֵין פּוֹתְחִין בַּחֲרָטָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ מְעוּמָּד.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: חֲזִי מָר הַאי מֵרַבָּנַן דַּאֲתָא מִמַּעְרְבָא וְאָמַר: אִיזְדְּקִיקוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לִבְרֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא בַּר אָבִין, וּשְׁרוֹ לֵיהּ נִדְרֵיהּ וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: זִיל וּבְעִי רַחֲמֵי עַל נַפְשָׁךְ דַּחֲטָאת. דְּתָנֵי רַב דִּימִי אֲחוּהּ דְּרַב סָפְרָא: כׇּל הַנּוֹדֵר, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מְקַיְּימוֹ — נִקְרָא חוֹטֵא. אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: מַאי קְרָא — ״וְכִי תֶחְדַּל לִנְדֹּר לֹא יִהְיֶה בְךָ חֵטְא״, הָא לֹא חָדַלְתָּ — אִיכָּא חֵטְא.
תַּנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ ״כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁתִּדּוֹרִי, אִי אֶפְשִׁי שֶׁתִּדּוֹרִי״, ״אֵין זֶה נֶדֶר״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. ״יָפֶה עָשִׂית״, וְ״אֵין כְּמוֹתֵךְ״, וְ״אִם לֹא נָדַרְתְּ, מַדִּירֵךְ אֲנִי״ — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.
לֹא יֹאמַר אָדָם לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת ״מוּפָר לִיכִי״, ״בָּטֵיל לִיכִי״, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁאוֹמֵר לָהּ בַּחוֹל, אֶלָּא אוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״טְלִי וְאִכְלִי״, ״טְלִי וּשְׁתִי״, וְהַנֶּדֶר בָּטֵל מֵאֵלָיו. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְצָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל בְּלִבּוֹ.
תַּנְיָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: בַּשַּׁבָּת מְבַטֵּל בְּלִבּוֹ, בַּחוֹל מוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה — מְבַטֵּל בְּלִבּוֹ, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לְהוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: חָכָם שֶׁאָמַר בִּלְשׁוֹן בַּעַל, וּבַעַל שֶׁאָמַר בִּלְשׁוֹן חָכָם — לָא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
דְּתַנְיָא: ״זֶה הַדָּבָר״ — הֶחָכָם מַתִּיר וְאֵין בַּעַל מַתִּיר. שֶׁיָּכוֹל: וּמָה חָכָם שֶׁאֵין מֵפֵר — מַתִּיר, בַּעַל שֶׁמֵּפֵר — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּתִּיר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר:
in a side room [kitona] of the study hall, while standing, alone and at night.
Rabba said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is that one can request the dissolution of vows even when the halakhic authority is standing or alone, i.e., without a court of three, as long as he is a halakhic authority, and that one can do so at night, on Shabbat, and by relatives, and even when those requesting dissolution on Shabbat had the opportunity to do so while it was still day, i.e., before Shabbat.
The Gemara raises a difficulty with this ruling: Can a judge dissolve a vow while standing? But it is taught in a baraita that Rabban Gamliel alighted from a donkey, and wrapped himself in his shawl in the customary manner of a judge, and sat, and dissolved a man’s vow for him. If one can dissolve a vow while standing, why did he sit? The Gemara explains: Rabban Gamliel holds that one must broach dissolution based on regret. In other words, a halakhic authority does not dissolve vows directly, but must prompt the one who took the vow to concede that he regrets having taken the vow in the first place. We require that the vow be uprooted, and he needed to examine the case; therefore, he sat down. But Rav Naḥman holds that one need not broach dissolution based on regret, and therefore a halakhic authority can dissolve the vow even while standing.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Master, see that Sage who came from the West, Eretz Yisrael, and who said: The Sages attended to the dissolution of a vow taken by the son of Rav Huna bar Avin, and they dissolved his vow and said to him: Go and request mercy for yourself, for you have sinned by taking a vow. As Rav Dimi, the brother of Rav Safra teaches: With regard to anyone who takes a vow, even if he fulfills it, he is called a sinner. Rav Zevid said: What verse teaches this? It is: “But if you refrain to vow, it will be no sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:23). It may be inferred that if you did not refrain from taking vows, there is sin.
§ It is taught in a baraita: One who says to his wife: Any vows which you will vow, I do not want [ee efshi] you to vow, or one who wants to nullify a vow and says: This is not a vow, has not said anything, as this is not a valid formula of nullification. If he says: You have done well, or: There are none like you, or: If you had not taken a vow, I, myself, would have taken a vow to obligate you in this, his statement is substantial, and the vow is ratified.
A man should not say to his wife when nullifying her vows on Shabbat: It is nullified for you, or: It is canceled for you, in the manner that he would say to her on weekdays. Rather, he should say to her, if she took a vow to refrain from food or drink: Take this and eat it, or: Take this and drink it, and the vow is canceled on its own. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And he must also cancel the vow in his heart; simply telling her to eat or drink is not sufficient.
It is taught in a baraita: Beit Shammai say: On Shabbat he cancels the vow in his heart and on a weekday he articulates the nullification with his lips. And Beit Hillel say: Both in this case and in that case, i.e., whether on Shabbat or a weekday, it is sufficient if he cancels the vow in his heart, and he need not articulate with his lips.
§ Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A halakhic authority who pronounced his dissolution of a vow with language appropriate to a husband, i.e., he said the word nullified instead of dissolved, or a husband who pronounced his nullification of a vow with language appropriate to a halakhic authority, i.e., he said the word dissolved instead of nullified, has not said anything. Each of them has the authority to cancel a vow only in the particular manner allotted to him.
As it is taught in a baraita: The verse “This is the thing which the Lord has commanded” (Numbers 30:2) indicates that the husband’s nullification, which is the topic of the subsequent verses, must be done specifically in this way. The Sages concluded that a halakhic authority dissolves a vow, but a husband does not dissolve it. As, one might have thought: And just as a halakhic authority, who cannot nullify vows, nevertheless dissolves them, so too with regard to a husband, who can nullify vows, is it not logical that he should also dissolve them? Therefore, the verse states:
כתובות ע״ד ב - הטקסט מספריא
מְמָאֶנֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת לָהּ.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָלְכָה אֵצֶל חָכָם וְהִתִּירָהּ — מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֵצֶל רוֹפֵא וְרִיפֵּא אוֹתָהּ — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מָה בֵּין חָכָם לְרוֹפֵא? חָכָם עוֹקֵר אֶת הַנֶּדֶר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ, וְרוֹפֵא אֵינוֹ מְרַפֵּא אֶלָּא מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא.
וְהָתַנְיָא: אֵצֶל חָכָם וְהִתִּירָהּ, אֵצֶל רוֹפֵא וְרִיפֵּא אוֹתָהּ — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת! אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא — רַבִּי מֵאִיר, הָא — רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין. הָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר: אֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין.
מַאי הִיא? דִּתְנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשּׁוּם נֶדֶר — לֹא יַחְזִיר. מִשּׁוּם שֵׁם רָע — לֹא יַחְזִיר.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כׇּל נֶדֶר שֶׁיָּדְעוּ בּוֹ רַבִּים — לֹא יַחֲזִיר. לֹא יָדְעוּ בּוֹ רַבִּים — יַחֲזִיר. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל נֶדֶר שֶׁצָּרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם — לֹא יַחֲזִיר. וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם — יַחֲזִיר.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד צָרִיךְ וְאֶחָד אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ — לֹא יַחֲזִיר. אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא אָסְרוּ צָרִיךְ אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? דִּכְתִיב:
she may refuse her husband and go on her way. According to this opinion, the marriage did not take effect at all, despite the fact that they engaged in sexual intercourse, because the betrothal involved an error.
§ The Sages taught: If a man betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, but there are vows incumbent upon her, and she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, she is betrothed. However, if he betroths her on condition that she has no blemishes, but she does have blemishes, and she goes to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed. The Gemara inquires: What is the difference between a halakhic authority and a doctor? The Gemara explains: When a halakhic authority dissolves a vow, he uproots the vow retroactively. It is as if she had never vowed at all, and therefore she was in fact not bound by vows at the time of their betrothal. But a doctor only heals from here onward. Since she had blemishes at the time of betrothal, she is in breach of his condition.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a different baraita that if she goes to a halakhic authority and he dissolves her vows, or to a doctor and he heals her blemishes, she is not betrothed? Rava said: This is not difficult, for this baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and that one follows Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara elaborates: This baraita, which states that if her vows were dissolved by a halakhic authority she is betrothed, is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who said that a man is willing for his wife to be degraded by going to court to have her vow dissolved. That baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that a man is not willing for his wife to be degraded in court. Consequently, even if she went to a halakhic authority and he dissolved her vows, such a solution is unacceptable to her husband, as he did not want her to go to court. Therefore, the betrothal is invalid even after the dissolution of the vow.
The Gemara poses a question: What is this fundamental dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 45b): If a man who divorces his wife due to a vow that she took subsequently regrets his decision and wants to take her back, he may not remarry her. Similarly, if he divorces her due to a bad reputation she has acquired, he may not remarry her. This is because if he were allowed to take her back if the vow is dissolved by a halakhic authority or after discovering that the rumors about her were false, he might say that had he known this he never would have divorced her. Such a statement would retroactively cast doubt on the validity of the bill of divorce and could potentially cause her children from a second marriage to have the status of mamzerim. He is therefore informed that if he divorces her due to a vow or a bad reputation he can never remarry her.
Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to any vow that is known by many people and therefore cannot be nullified, he may not remarry her. If it is not known by many people, but rather is a private matter between them, he may remarry her. Rabbi Meir says: Any vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority, that is, the husband cannot nullify it himself and she needs a halakhic authority to analyze the vow carefully to find an opening that will permit its dissolution, he may not remarry her, for he can claim that had he known the vow could be dissolved he would never have divorced her, thereby undermining the bill of divorce. And with regard to a vow that does not require the investigation by a halakhic authority, which he knows he can nullify himself, he may remarry her. There is no concern that he might impair the bill of divorce, as he knew he could dissolve the vow and yet he chose to divorce her regardless.
Rabbi Elazar says: Both in the case of a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority and one that does not require it, he may not remarry her. Rabbi Elazar said in explanation of his view: They prohibited remarrying a woman who was bound by a vow that requires investigation by a halakhic authority only due to a vow that does not require such investigation. The Gemara explains the respective opinions: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s statement? As it is written:
נדרים ס״ח א - הטקסט מספריא
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּין אָב לְבִתּוֹ״, מִכָּאן לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה שֶׁאָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. וּלְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, ״אִם הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?
מוֹקֵים לְאִידַּךְ דְּרָבָא. וְרָבָא, הַאי דְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לוֹמַר שֶׁהַבַּעַל מֵיפֵר נְדָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בַּעַל מִיגָּז גָּיֵיז, אוֹ מִקְלָישׁ קָלֵישׁ? הֵיכָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן: כְּגוֹן דִּנְדַרָה מִתְּרֵין זֵיתִין וּשְׁמַע אָרוּס וְהֵיפֵר לַהּ, וַאֲכַלְתִּנּוּן.
אִי אָמְרִינַן מִיגָּז גָּיֵיז — לָקְיָיא. אִי אָמְרִינַן מִקְלָישׁ קָלֵישׁ — אִיסּוּרָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא. מַאי?
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵימָתַי אָמְרוּ מֵת הַבַּעַל נִתְרוֹקְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב — בִּזְמַן שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע הַבַּעַל קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּמוּת, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע וְשָׁתַק, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע וְהֵפֵר וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם. זוֹ הִיא שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ: מֵת הַבַּעַל נִתְרוֹקְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב.
The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different source for the halakha in the mishna: The Torah states with regard to vows: “These are the statutes, which the Lord commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter, being in her youth, in her father’s house” (Numbers 30:17). From here it is derived with regard to a betrothed young woman that her father and her husband nullify her vows. The Gemara asks: And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with the words “and if she be to a husband” (Numbers 30:7)?
The Gemara answers: According to him, he establishes it to teach the other statement of Rava: If her betrothed died without ratifying the vow, her father can nullify it on his own. The Gemara then asks: And Rava, who derives the halakha that the father and the betrothed of the young woman together nullify her vows from the phrase “and if she be to a husband” (Numbers 30:7), what does he do with this verse that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught as the source for the father and the betrothed nullifying the young woman’s vows? The Gemara answers: He requires that phrase: “Between a man and his wife” (Numbers 30:17), in order to say that the husband can nullify only vows that are between him and her, i.e., vows that negatively impact their marital relationship, but he cannot nullify any other type of vow.
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a husband nullifies his betrothed’s vow, does he sever his share of the vow or does he weaken the force of the entire vow? The Gemara clarifies: Under which circumstances do we raise the dilemma, i.e., what is the practical difference between these two possibilities? In a case where she vowed not to derive benefit from two olives, and her betrothed heard and nullified the vow for her, and she ate those two olives before her father nullified the vow, there is a practical difference.
If we say that he severs his share of the vow, nullifying half of the prohibition, then one of the olives remains completely forbidden, and she is flogged for violating her vow. If we say that he weakens its force, she is not liable to be flogged, as eating the olives is now merely a prohibition that she has violated. If so, what is the ruling with regard to this question?
The Gemara now cites a lengthy baraita, ultimately stating a proof to answer the previous question. Come and hear a baraita that will resolve the dilemma: When did they say that if the husband of a betrothed young woman dies, the authority to nullify her vows reverts to the father, who can then nullify her vows on his own? This occurs in a case when the husband had not heard her vow before he died; or in a case where he heard and was silent; or where he heard and nullified it and died on the same day. This is what we learned in the mishna, concerning a case of this kind (70a): If the husband dies, the authority to nullify vows reverts to the father.
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